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In Girouard v. United States,' the petitioner was a Canadian
citizen, a member of the Seventh Day Adventists, and a resident of
Massachusetts. He filed a petition for citizenship stating that he
understood the principles of the government of the United States, be-
lieved in its form of government, and was willing to take the oath
of allegiance. In answer to the question in the application "If neces-
sary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?"
he replied, "No (Non-combatant) Seventh Day Adventist." At the
hearing in the District Court petitioner testified that he was willing to
serve in the army but would not bear arms. The District Court
admitted him to citizenship on the ground that since the Selective
Service and Training Act permitted a selectee to refuse to serve
except as a noncombatant, petitioner could take an unqualified oath
of allegiance to the United States by exercising in advance the right
given under this Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on
the authority of the United States v. Schwimmer,2 United States v.
Macintosh and United States v. Bland Upon certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court
of Appeals and held that the oath of allegiance did not require a
promise to bear arms and that in the absence of unequivocal
language by Congress to the contrary the Court could not imply
such a promise as a prerequisite to naturalization. The majority
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, overruled the general prin-
ciple laid down in the Schwimmer, Macintosh, and Bland cases. Mr.
Chief Justice Stone gave a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice
Reed and, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred.
The power of Congress to regulate naturalization is among its
enumerated powers in the Constitution.' In exercising this power,
Congress has enacted laws which require, among other things, that
each alien take an oath of allegiance before admission to citizenship,
which oath is substantially as follows:
"I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and
entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen;
that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws
of the United States of America against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and al-
'--U. S. - , 66 S. Ct. 826, 90 L. Ed. 776 (1946); noted in
30 MARQ. L. Rzv. 130, 14 GEo. WASH. L. R. 641.
2279 U.S. 644, 49 S. Ct. 448, 73 L. Ed. 889 (1929).
'283 U.S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302 (1931).
283 U.S. 636, 51 S. Ct. 569, 75 L. Ed. 1319 (1931).
6 U.S. CONST. Art. 1, Sec. 8: "The Congress shall have power
.... To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization."
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legiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
So help me God."'
In addition to the requirement of the oath of allegiance Con-
gress has also required that the court be satisfied that the alien has
"behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to
the good order and happiness of the same" during the five-year
period immediately preceding his application.'
In the Schwimmer case,' the applicant was a woman forty-nine
years of age, was a linguist, lecturer and writer, was well educated
and accustomed to discussing governments and civic affairs. She
stated that she was an uncompromising pacifist with no sense of
nationalism but only a "cosmic" sense of belonging to the human
family. With three justices dissenting,' the Supreme Court held
that the applicant was not entitled to citizenship. In supporting the
holding the Court stated: "whatever tends to lessen the willingness
of citizens to discharge their duty to bear arms in the country's
defense detracts from the strength and safety of the Government..".
Two other grounds for the decision in the Schwimmer case
were: (1) That it is the duty of citizens to defend the government
by force of arms when necessity arises and that such duty is a
fundamental principle of the Constitution;1 and (2) That citizen-
ship is a high privilege and where doubt exists as to whether it
should be granted or not, such doubt should be resolved in favor of
the United States and against the applicant.'
The rule of the Schwimmer case, namely, that an alien who re-
fuses to bear arms will not be admitted to citizenship, controlled the
later cases of United States v. Macintosh' and United States v.
Bland,"' which were decided by the Supreme Court on the same day.
The applicant in the Macintosh case was unwilling to take the oath
of allegiance unless with the qualification that he refused to bear
arms in any future war which in his opinion was not morally
justified. In the Bland case, the applicant, a woman, refused to take
the oath of allegiance except with the written interpolation of the
words, "as far as my conscience as a Christian will allow." The
'Act June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 597, 598, as amended June 20, 1939,
C. 224, sec. 3, 54 Stat. 844; 54 Stat. 1157, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 735 (b),
8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 735 (b), 1940.
1 Naturalization Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 598, Sec. 4; 54 Stat. 1142,
5 U.S.C. Sec. 707 (a), 8 U.S.C.A. 707 (a), (1940).
279 U.S. 644, 49 S. Ct. 448, 73 L. Ed. 889 (1929).
'Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Sanford.
"279 U.S. 644 at 650, 49 S. Ct. 448, 73 L. E. 889 (1929).
"Ibid.
,Id. at 649; U.S. v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463 at 467, 48 S. Ct. 328, 72
L. Ed. 889 (1929).
L283 U.S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302 (1931).
"283 U.S. 636, 51 S. Ct. 569, 75 L. Ed. 1319 (1931).
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Court denied citizenship in both cases. Chief Justice Hughes dis-
sented and his dissent was concurred in by Justices Holmes, Brandeis
and Stone. In the majority opinion of the Macintosh case, the Court
stated:
"It is not within the province of the courts to make
bargains with those who seek naturalization. They must
accept the grant and take the oath in accordance with the
terms fixed by law, or forego the privilege of citizenship.
There is no middle choice. If one qualification of the
oath be allowed, the door is opened for others, with utter
confusion as the probable final result. Citizenship is a
high privilege, and when doubts exist concerning a grant
of it, generally at least, they should be resolved in favor
of the United States and against the claimant."'
A dispassionate and objective consideration of the cases involv-
ing the present subject matter is difficult. However, the question
presented is one of statutory construction. The power to regulate
naturalization is given by the Constitution to Congress. Has Con-
gress enacted the requirement that applicants for citizenship
promise to bear arms in defense of this country? To answer the
precise question presented by the cases, the legislative history of
the naturalization laws must be studied carefully. The decisions in
the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland cases were controlled by the
Naturalization Act of 1906.6 However, between the time of those de-
cisions and the decision in the Girouard case Congress passed other
statutes on the subject. In 1940 the Nationality Act was passed.
This Act included, in substantially the same form, the requirements
of the oath of allegiance' and the requirement that the applicant
must satisfy the Court that he has been attached to the principles
of the Constitution during the five-year period preceding his ap-
plication'
Chief Justice Stone, dissenting in the Girouard case, took the
position that Congress, by passing the Nationality Act of 1940, which
reenacted the pertinent provisions of the Naturalization Act of 1906,
adopted and confirmed the construction placed upon those pro-
visions by the Supreme Court in the cases of Schwimmer, Macintosh
and Bland." The position taken by Chief Justice Stone was further
strengthened by the legislative attempts made in Congress from the
time of the decisions in the three cases last mentioned and the enact-
ment of the Nationality Act of 1940." All of those attempts by the
Court to change the construction of the Act of 1906 failed. With
-283 U.S. 605 at 626, 51 S. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302 (1931).
" 34 Stat. 598, Sec. 4.
1154 Stat. 1157 (1940), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 735 (b), 8 U.S.C.A. Sec.
735 (b).
1854 Stat. 1142 (1940), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 707 (a), 8 U.S.C.A. Sec.
707 (a).
U.S.-, 66 S. Ct. 826 at 831, 90 L. Ed. 776 (1946).
2 8lbid.
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this knowledge the Congress reenacted the provisions of the Act
of 1906.
In 1942 the Nationality Act was amended so as to permit aliens
who were performing military duties for the United States to be
exempt from certain requirements for citizenship."' No change was
made in tlhe oath; nor was any change made in the requirement
that the alien be attached to the principles of the Constitution.
These admendments have been construed to cover non-combatants
as well as combatants.' The majority opinion in the Girouard case
rests largely upon this amendment, the proposition being that since
both a non-combatant alien serving in the military service and an
alien who has not so served must take the same oath of allegiance,
that oath cannot exact more from the one than the other. Carrying
this line of reasoning further, since Congress has provided for the
naturalization of non-combatant aliens who serve in the armed
forces, then, by so doing, Congress has of necessity put the alien
who has not served in any capacity and has refused to bear arms
upon the same ground. -This was stated to follow because- the "oath
can hardly be adequate for one who is unwilling to bear arms be-
cause of religious scruples and yet exact from another a promise to
bear arms despite religious scruples."'
The majority opinion in the Girouard case pointed out that the
oath required by aliens did not in terms require that applicants for
citizenship promise to bear arms. The Court also stated that the
bearing of arms is not the only way in which our institutions may
be supported and defended, and reference was made to a host of
non-combatant posts which are necessary in present-day total war.
An analogy was drawn between the conscientious-objector-alien
and the conscientious-objector-citizen. The latter, like all persons
inducted into the armed forces, is required by Congress to take an
oath "that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States
of America; that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against
all of their enemies whomsoever."'" The Court stated that this "is
recognition by Congress that even in time of war one may truly
support and defend our institutions though he stops short of using
weapons of war."
The Girouard case presents a question of statutory construction
and as such should have been decided according to the applicable
rules of construction. It has long been an established rule of
statutory construction that in the interpretation of reenacted statutes,
"'56 Stat. 182 (1942), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, Supp. III. (1944),
8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1001.
'In re Kinloch, 53 F. Supp. 521 (1944).
'Girouard v. United States, - U.S.-, 66 S. Ct. 826 at
829, 90 L. Ed. 776 (1946).
41 Stat. 809, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1581, 10 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1581.
Girouard v. United States, - U.S. - , 66 S. Ct. 826 at
828, 90 L. Ed. 776 (1946).
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the court will follow the construction which they received when
previously in force.:' By reenactment, in the same or substantially
the same terms, the legislature is deemed to have adopted and con-
firmed the construction which has been placed upon th4 statutes
prior to the reenactment. The rule extends to cases where the re-
enactment is by way of incorporation in a code or revision of statutes,
or where a statute was originally enacted in another state.
' Apply-
ing this rule to the case under consideration, Congress, by enacting
the Nationality Act of 1940, gave its legislative sanction to the general
rule established by the Schwimmer case. Did the 1942 amendments
of the Nationality Act change this state of the law? As applied to
the instant case, they did not. The amendments provided, among
other things that concessions and favors given were not extended to
conscientious objectors who performed no military duty or refused
to wear the uniform.' Girouard did not fall within the class ex-
empted by the amendments. The 1942 amendments were, by their
own terms, limited to aliens who had performed military service,
and did not extend to all aliens. To extend these statutes to all
aliens is to add to them by implication, and amounts to judicial
legislation.
It seems clear that the Court would have been upon safer jround
if it had decided the Girouard case according to the applicable rule
of statutory interpretation. It is the function of Congress to enact
laws and establish the policy to be followed as regards naturalizing
aliens. It appears that Chief Justice Stone rightfully concluded his
dissent when he stated: "It is not the function of this Court to dis-
regard the will of Congress in the exercise of its constitutional
power."'
WILLIAM 0. GILBREATH
Holvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151, 55 S. Ct. 17, 79 L. Ed. 246,
97 A.L.R. 207 (1934); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 50 S. Ct. 115,
74 L. Ed. 457 (1929); ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (1888)
Sec. 368, p. 515; SUTHERLAND,, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1891) Sec.
256, p. 336-337.
"' ENDLICH, op. cit. supra note 26.
28 U.S.C. Supp. IV, Sec. 1004, 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1004.
- Girouard v. United States, - U.S. - , 66 S. Ct. 826 at
834, 90 L. Ed. 776 (1946).
